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Abstract: 
This paper studies the association between the market’s expectations of Saddam 
Hussein’s fall from power, as reflected in “Saddam contract” prices, and stock prices, oil 
prices and exchange rates.  During the war, a rise in the probability of Saddam’s fall, 
which also indicated a speedy end to the war, was positively and significantly associated 
with stock prices, strengthened the dollar against the Euro, and lowered oil prices.  
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the probability of a costly war breaking out, lowered stock prices, which adjusted 
gradually to this information.  
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1. Introduction 
Early in the morning of March 20, 2003 (Iraq time), the U.S. launched about 40 
missiles at a site where Saddam Hussein had been thought to be present, thus starting the 
second Gulf War.  Months earlier, President George W. Bush had declared his intention 
of toppling Saddam Hussein and changing Iraq’s regime, and the world had been 
expecting a possible outbreak of war since the summer of 2002. It was stalled because of 
political hurdles and maneuvers and because it took time to amass the military forces that 
would launch the war.  This paper examines the effects of these events on stock prices in 
the U.S.  
 It is difficult to study the effects of political events on the economy because of the 
scarcity of data on the public’s expectations about forthcoming events before they 
actually occur.  Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) examined the effect on stock prices 
of 49 non-economic world news items between 1941 and 1987 and concluded that they 
had “surprisingly small effect” (p. 8)1.  Cutler et al. (1989) also found that publicly 
available macroeconomic news on fundamental values explained less than half of the 
variance in aggregate stock prices. This led Cutler et al. (1989) to suggest that moves in 
stock prices reflect something other than news about fundamental values. “Although the 
hypothesis that stock prices move in response to news that is observed by market 
participants but not by investigators studying the markets is irrefutable, we are skeptical 
of this possibility” (p. 9).  Indeed, events are often preceded by expectations that are not 
observed by researchers and thus part of the effect of news on stock prices is already 
incorporated in the prices by the time the event is announced.  This leads to an 
                                                 
1 Frey and Kucher (2000) and Waldenstrom and Frey (2002) find significant effects of political events, 
around and during the Second World War on European government bond prices.  
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underestimation of the effect of the event’s announcement on stock prices.  There are also 
cases where expectations that affect stock prices do not materialize and therefore the 
events are not observed, thus the effects of the would-be events cannot be studied.  
 In this study, we resolve the problem of measuring the effects of expectations 
about political and economic events by using market-determined odds of Saddam 
Hussein’s fall from power. In the fall of 2002, the web site Tradesports.com, which 
provides a platform for on-line betting, initiated a contract that promised $10 on the 
expiration day of the contract if Saddam Hussein was out of power (“not recognized 
internationally as the leader of Iraq”) by then. This web site, which operates from Ireland, 
is organized as an electronic exchange with an open limit order book. The prices are 
quoted in integers between 0 and 100 (100 means $10). Thus, the price reflected the 
probability of Saddam’s fall from power by the expiration of the contract (ignoring risk 
premium considerations).  The fees were 0.4% for buy/sell/payment.  The market was 
quite active when the likelihood of war increased, and there were days with many 
intraday transactions.  
 We use the prices of these contracts, which we call “Saddam contracts,” as a 
market-based measure of the probability of Saddam’s fall by a specified time (the 
contract’s expiration day).  We assume that traders in these contracts reflected in their 
actions the general public view at that time, and thus the contract prices reflected the 
market’s beliefs about the probability of Saddam’s fall.  Our study examines the 
relationship between these beliefs and the stock market by studying the relationship 
between the Saddam contract price changes and stock returns. 
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This raises the question: what information is reflected in the Saddam contract 
prices and what is its economic meaning.  We propose that there is a distinction between 
the economic information conveyed by these prices before the war and during the war.  
Consider first the pre-war period.  Then, a rise in the Saddam contract price had two 
conflicting meanings. A rise in the Saddam contract price meant an increase in the 
probability of war, which means greater economic cost and greater uncertainty about the 
future course of the economy. This has negative effect on the economy. Nordhaus (2002) 
estimated that the cost of war would depend on its duration. A short and successful war 
would cost $99 billion, whereas the cost of a prolonged war would reach $1.924 trillion, 
more than 19 times higher.  This burden on the economy would erode the value of stocks.  
The problem with the war is thus both its high expected costs and the uncertainty that it 
introduces, as evident from the large range of outcomes calculated by Nordhaus (2002).  
Greater economic uncertainty raises the risk premium demanded by investors and 
consequently reduces stock prices.  Political risk is known to negatively affect asset 
prices. Using proxies from the exchange rate market in Mexico, Bailey and Chung (1995) 
showed that increased political risk there raised the equity market premiums for exposure 
to this risk and subsequently lowered equity prices.  Erb, Campbell and Viskanta (1995) 
demonstrated that uncertainties brought about by inflation raise the equity risk premium 
and lowered stock prices. Nordhaus (2002) indeed noted that inflation could be one 
outcome of a prolonged war due to rising oil prices.  It follows that both the expected cost 
of the war and the high uncertainty that it would entail meant that a rise in the probability 
of war should have negative effect on stock prices. 
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On the other hand, the U.S. government claimed that ousting Saddam Hussein 
would reduce the risk of future terror attacks and enable an increase in the supply of oil 
after the sanctions on Iraq were lifted. This would produce economic benefits that would 
have a positive effect on the stock market.   Thus, the information reflected in the price of 
the Saddam contract was mixed before the war.  If the dominant interpretation is that 
higher price means greater likelihood of a costly war with higher economic uncertainty, 
then the information conveyed by a rise in the Saddam contract price is economically 
negative. 
However, conditional on the war breaking out, a rise in the probability of 
Saddam’s fall was related to the speed with which the war was fought and meant a fast 
and successful conclusion of the war.  That is, all new information after the war begun 
was about how quickly it would be won.  Following Nordhaus (2002) analysis, a fast 
conclusion of the war would considerably lower its cost (it is reasonable to assume that 
the cost of war is rising with the length of the war).  This would be beneficial for the U.S. 
economy.  Also, a quick ending to the war narrows the possible range of outcomes and 
lowers economic uncertainty, which in turn reduces the risk premium required by 
investors.  Both the lower expected cost and the lower uncertainty about the cost should 
make stock prices rise.  In addition, the benefits from ousting Saddam Hussein, such as 
reduced risk of terror attacks and lower oil prices, would accrue sooner and help raise 
stock prices. 
Thus, while before the war, a rise in the Saddam contract price included mixed or 
negative economic information, once the war actually broke out, a rise in the Saddam 
contract price meant good news for the U.S. economy.  
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These changing interpretations of the Saddam contract prices are reflected in our 
findings. Before the war, the effect on stock prices of changes in the probability of 
Saddam’s fall was weakly negative, while during the war these changes had a strong 
positive effect on stock prices. Similarly, we find that during the war, oil prices reacted 
negatively to expectations about Saddam’s fall and the U.S. dollar strengthened against 
the Euro.  Before the war, the effects were opposite (though the statistical significance of 
the results was low).  
 In what follows, we present our results on the association between the market’s 
expectations on Saddam’s fall and the stock market in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss 
the differences between our results and those of a related study by Leigh, Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2003).  We offer concluding remarks in Section 4. 
 
2. Empirical evidence  
2.1 Data  
We use three Saddam contracts:  
1. The March 2003 contract, which started on September 24, 2002 and expired 
worthless at the end of March 2003, 
2. The June 2003 contract, which started on September 24, 2002,  
3. The April 2003 contract, which started on February 6, 2003.  
The last two contracts were still open during the Gulf war.  For these contracts, 
Tradesports provided us with daily price data through April 11, 2003, on which day the 
June and April contract prices were 98 and 97, respectively.  We denote the price series 
of these contracts by MARCH, JUNE and APRIL (contract prices are divided by 100), and 
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the respective daily price changes are denoted by DMARCH, DJUNE and DAPRIL.  We 
use mostly the April and June contracts, which were still open during the war. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
INSERT TABLE 1 
The daily prices of the three contracts are presented in the two panels of Figure 1., 
and the statistics on the daily changes in the contract prices are presented in Table 1. The 
data are divided by the date of initiation of the April contract, 2/6/2003; in each period we 
study two contracts trading with different maturity dates. Figure 1A depicts the prices of 
the March and June contracts up to 2/5/2003, and Figure 1B depicts the prices of the 
April and June contracts from the beginning of the April contract.  As expected, JUNE > 
MARCH and JUNE > APRIL for all days because the probability of Saddam’s fall was 
higher the further away was the expiration day of the contract.  The contract prices show 
considerable variations, indicating the wide variation in anticipations of Saddam’s fall as 
events progressed.  In accordance with expectations, the shorter contracts (March and 
April) were more sensitive to news about Saddam’s fall and hence their volatility is 
greater, with the difference being most apparent during the war.  Once the war started, the 
probability of Saddam’s fall was quite high, but there was a great deal of uncertainty 
about whether this would occur by the end of April, hence the sharp fall in the April price 
when it was found that Saddam had not been hit by U.S. bombs.  We obtain that 
Corr(DMARCH, DJUNE) = 0.66 and Corr(DAPRIL, DJUNE) = 0.59 in the periods 
9/24/2002-2/5/2002 and 2/6/2002-4/11/2003, respectively. These correlations are not 
very high, because the relationship between the respective probabilities is not linear, and 
there is also a considerable amount of noise in the contract prices.  
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 Table 1 also presents the results of autoregressive models where DPRICEt 
(=DMARCHt, DAPRILt and DJUNEt) is regressed on its four lagged values, with the 
respective coefficients being ρ1 to ρ4.  We obtain that for the March and June contracts, 
ρ1 is negative and insignificant whereas for the April contract, for which the data series is 
shorter,2 ρ1 is positive and statistically significant.  The positive ρ1 for the April contract 
is, however, due to the war period only; before the war broke out, ρ1 is negative and 
statistically insignificant, as are the coefficients ρ1 for the other two contracts.  For all 
contracts, none of the coefficients of lags 2, 3 and 4 is significantly different from zero. 
  
2.2 The effect on stock prices: The S&P 500 index 
We test the effect of the expectations of Saddam’s fall on stock prices, employing 
the S&P 500 stock index.  RMt denotes the daily return on this index.  We estimate the 
following models: 
RMt = α  + β⋅ DPRICEt + ut  .  (1) 
DPRICEt is the first difference of the Saddam contract price (DPRICEt = DMARCHt, 
DAPRILt or DJUNEt).  Estimations are done over three periods, where in each we have 
two contracts trading. 
Period 1: The pre-war period preceding the inception of the April contract, 9/24/2002- 
2/5/2003 (92 days). We use March and June contract prices. 
Period 2: The immediate pre-war period when both the April and the June contracts 
traded, 2/6/2003-3/14/2003 (26 days). 
                                                 
2 On the bias in autoregressive coefficients in finite series, see Kendall (1954). The bias is greater the 
shorter the time series. 
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Period 3: The war period, 3/17/2003-4/11/2003, the last 20 days of the sample. (The war 
actually started on 3/20/2003.) We use the April and June contract prices. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 The estimation results, presented in Table 2 show that in Period 3 – the war period 
– stock prices reacted positively and quite strongly to changes in the probability of 
Saddam’s fall.  The coefficient β is positive and highly significant for both the April and 
June contracts, with the R2 exceeding 40%.  The magnitude of the coefficients DJUNE 
means that a 10% rise in the probability of Saddam’s fall raised stock prices by about 3%. 
The effect of the April contract is about half that strong.  The positive economic effect of 
the rise in the Saddam contract price is consistent with our interpretation of its meaning: a 
speedy conclusion to the war and the realization of benefits from the ousting of Saddam 
Hussein, such as lower oil prices and lower uncertainty and risk.   
For the two periods before 2/6/2003, β is negative but very small and statistically 
insignificant for all contracts.3  This may reflect the mixed meaning of the Saddam 
contract prices before the war started: a rise in the probability of Saddam’s fall may be 
good news, but it indicates a greater likelihood of a costly war breaking out. 
Model (1) presents a joint test that (a) there is an association between the news 
about Saddam fall and stock prices, and (b) news is promptly incorporated into the prices 
of both Saddam contracts and stocks. However, if any of these markets are inefficient, the 
relationship between the two price series, RMt and DPRICEt, could be non-
contemporaneous.  To test possible lagged effects of DPRICEt on RMt, we estimate the 
following model: 
                                                 
3 The Saddam contract prices are noisy (due to infrequent trading and large bid-ask spread), which could 
bias the estimated β coefficient downward due to the well-known errors-in-the-variables problem. 
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RMt = α  + β1⋅ DPRICEt + β2⋅ DPRICEt-1 + β3⋅ DPRICEt-2 + ut  , (2) 
where DPRICEt = DMARCHt, DAPRILt or DJUNEt.  If the information in DPRICEt were 
only partially incorporated into stock prices on the day that it was available, then β2 and 
β2 should have the same sign as β1.  Also, β2 could have the same sign as β1 because of a 
slight mismatch between the timing of our observations on Saddam contract prices and on 
stock prices.  The contract prices are as of 24:00 hours Ireland time, which is 19:00 New 
York time.  This means that news about Saddam, which arrived between 16:00 (market 
closing) and 19:00 New York time, was reflected in the market prices on the following 
day.  However, these three hours are between the hours 0:00 and 3:00 (Iraq time), when 
little news is generated; hence the three hours mismatch is not expected to generate any 
significant effect.  
On the other hand, if there were an overreaction of stock prices to information 
about Saddam’s fall, then the sign of β2 and possibly β2 should be opposite to that of β1. 
The estimation results of model (2) are presented in Table 2.  Consider the effect 
of the March contract, which was more actively traded than the June contract.  For the 
first period, 9/24/02-2/5/03, all three coefficients of DMARCH are negative and of about 
the same magnitude, although none is significant. The cumulative effect of the three 
coefficients is –0.16, meaning that a 10% increase in the probability of Saddam’s fall 
lowered stock prices by 1.6%.  Regressing RMt on the cumulative change in the March 
contract price, (DMARCHt + DMARCHt-1 + DMARCHt-2)/3, yields a coefficient of –0.16 
with marginal significance, t = 1.76.  The persistence of a negative lagged effect of 
DMARCHt on RMt is surprising since it suggests that news about Saddam’s fall, which 
was publicly known and incorporated in the prices of the Saddam contract, was only 
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gradually incorporated into stock prices.  These results seem inconsistent with the belief 
that stock prices promptly reflect all publicly available information.  
For the war period, the lagged effects of DPRICEt indicate some overreaction to 
information. For both the April and June contracts, the sign of β2 is opposite to that of β1 
and |β2| < β1, implying that the effect of DPRICEt on one day was partially reversed on 
the following day.  However, the coefficient β2 for the June contract is not significantly 
different from zero, indicating that the price reversal is insignificant.  For the April 
contract, the negative coefficient β2 is statistically significant and the positive cumulative 
effect on stock prices is marginally significant. The strong reversal in the April contract 
may have been caused by the sharp and unusually large decline in the contract price after 
the outbreak of war, after it was disclosed that Saddam survived a bomb attack, which 
was quickly reversed when information arrived about the success of the U.S. campaign 
(see Figure 1, Panel B).  As discussed earlier, the price of the April contract reacted to 
news more extremely than the price of the June contract because of the April contract’s 
shorter time to expiration.  Stock prices reacted more moderately to news, as did the price 
of the June contract, because once the war started, it was highly likely that Saddam would 
be defeated. The impact on stock prices was only to the extent of the time it would take to 
accomplish that end and the cost associated with it.  Hence, both stock prices, which 
reflect long-run expectations, and the June contract price, which has a longer time to 
expiration, reacted more moderately to events than did the price of the short-term April 
contract. 
In summary, while during the pre-war period the information about Saddam’s fall 
was incorporated gradually into stock prices, during the war it was quickly incorporated. 
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One explanation for this difference is greater investor exposure to news and discussions 
during the war, which heightened their attention and made stock prices respond more 
promptly to news.  Thus, it is not only the content of the news that matters; the extent of 
its influence on stock prices also depends on the intensity with which the news is 
broadcasted to the public. 
 
2.3. Effects on sector stock indices, oil prices and exchange rates 
 The analysis so far employed the S&P 500 index, which comprises the stocks of 
large firms.  It could well be that the prospect of the war and Saddam’s fall have different 
effects on smaller firms’ stocks.  We examine this by employing two exchange-traded 
funds (ETFs) of S&P 400 mid-cap firms and S&P 600 small-cap firms. Their respective 
symbols are IJH and IJR. (These ETFs are managed by BGI.) We estimate the following 
model: 
Rjt = αj  + βj DJUNEt + γj RMRESt + ujt  , (3) 
where Rjt is the return on stock index j. We use the two size-based stock indices: j = IJH, 
IJR. RMRESt is the residual from a regression of RMt, the daily return on the S&P 500 
stock index on DJUNEt (and a constant).  This variable controls for factors that affect 
stock returns but are unrelated to the war.  The inclusion of RMRESt does not affect the 
point estimate of βj but it makes the estimate more accurate by reducing its standard error 
(thus raising the t statistics). Model (3) is estimated for the last two subperiods: 26 days 
before the war and 20 days of the war. The results are presented in Table 3.  
INSERT TABLE 3  
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 The results show contrasting effects of the Saddam contract prices on stock 
returns before the war and during the war, and a difference between the extent of the 
reaction of large and small stocks before the war.  During the war period, β  > 0, that is, 
the prices of both indices – mid-cap and small-cap – rise with the price of the Saddam 
contract. This is similar to what we observe in Table 2 for the S&P 500 stock index.4 
However, in the pre-war period we obtain β  < 0.  That is, a rise in the Saddam contract 
price is associated with a significant decline in the prices of small-cap and mid-cap 
stocks, after controlling for market-wide effects.  The β  coefficient of small firms is 
slightly more negative than the coefficient for mid-cap firms or the S&P 500 firms, 
indicating that before the war started, smaller firms were considered more vulnerable to 
the likelihood of an outbreak of war, which was thought to be economically costly.5  
The estimation results of model (3) are replicated for both Periods 2 and 3 using 
DAPRILt in lieu of DJUNEt. The results are qualitatively similar, that is, the estimated βj 
is positive and significant for Period 3 (war period) and negative and significant for 
Period 2 (pre-war period). 
 Next, model (3) is used to estimate the effect of the market’s expectations of 
Saddam’s fall on nine stock ETFs that pertain to the following sector stock indices: 
energy, consumer staples, consumer discretionary, industrial, materials, healthcare and 
utilities (these ETFs are managed by State Street).  The results are presented in Table 3.  
Here too we obtain that for the war period, the β coefficients of all sector indices are 
                                                 
4 The high level of statistical significance of β of the size indices, relative to that in Table 2 for RM (the 
return on the S&P 500 index), is due to the presence of RMRES on the RHS of model (3). Without this 
variable, the t statistics of β are much lower. For the war period, the t statistics of β are 2.84 for RIJH and 
2.49 for RIJR, lower than that of RM. For the pre-war period, the β coefficients become statistically 
insignificant when RMRES is not included in the model. 
5 We also estimated the model employing the Newey-West (1987) method with MA=1, to account for 
residual autocorrelation. The results are unchanged. 
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positive and mostly significant, and they are negative and mostly significant for the short 
pre-war period.  When using DAPRILt in lieu of DJUNEt in model (4), the coefficient β is 
again positive and similarly significant for the war period.  For the pre-war period, β is 
negative but most of the coefficients are not statistically significant. 
 The energy stock index stands out as having a low β coefficient during the war, 
which is statistically insignificant.  This is because of its dependence on the price of oil 
and on the economy at large. Given that before the war Iraq’s oil sales were constrained, 
Saddam’s fall should lower oil prices due to the prospective increase in Iraq’s oil supply.  
So oil companies are subject to two conflicting effects: a successful war will be good for 
the economy, which should raise their stock prices, but will also lower oil prices, which 
will hurt them if they have oil reserves. The question is, what is the effect of the 
probability of Saddam’s fall on oil prices. We estimate the following model: 
ROILt = α  + β1 DJUNEt + β2 DJUNEt-1 + ujt ,  (4) 
ROILt denotes the daily return (percent change) on the spot price of crude oil (West 
Texas Intermediate. Source: Wall Street Journal and Department of Energy. Prices are as 
of 4:00 pm New York time).  The estimation results are presented in Table 4. 
INSERT TABLE 4  
Consistent with our analysis, a rise in the probability of Saddam’s fall during the 
war reduced oil prices.  Cumulatively over two days, a 1% increase in the probability of 
Saddam’s fall lowered oil prices by nearly 1%.  While neither of the two slope 
coefficients is statistically significant, when we replace the two variables on the RHS of 
model (4) by their cumulative average, (DJUNEt + DJUNEt-1)/2, we obtain a coefficient 
 
13 
of –0.98 with t=1.89, marginally significant.6  Also, using DAPRILt in lieu of DJUNEt, 
we obtain a coefficient of –0.32 with t = 2.20, statistically significant.  These results are 
consistent with our explanation for the weak effect of the probability of Saddam’s fall on 
energy stocks prices due to conflicting effects.  The resulting decline in oil prices on the 
one hand, and the economic improvement reflected in the rise in the stock market on the 
other hand, makes the total effect on energy stocks insignificantly different from zero.  
During the pre-war period, a rise in the Saddam contract price may have implied potential 
disruptions in oil supply, which would raise oil prices. Then, the effect of the Saddam 
contract prices on oil prices is positive but it is not statistically significant. 
 We also estimated model (3) for Period 1, 9/24/2002 to 2/5/2003 (92 days).  The 
results are mixed. The coefficients β of the two size-based indices are insignificantly 
different from zero. For the nine sector indices, the results are mixed. The coefficients β 
of XLI and XLB (industrial and materials, respectively) are positive and significant, while 
the coefficient of XLB (technology) is negative and significant. The rest are not 
statistically significant.  Therefore it is hard to make a firm conclusion on the effect of the 
probability of Saddam’s fall on stock prices during the pre-war period, which we denote 
as Period 1.  This is consistent with our suggestion that the information reflected in the 
Saddam contract prices during that period was mixed.  It is also consistent with our 
findings on the precarious statistical significance of the estimated coefficients during that 
period.  For the energy stock index (XLE), the coefficient was positive with marginal 
statistical significance, t = 1.77. This may reflect the positive effect of DJUNE on oil 
prices during this period; however, the latter relationship has low statistical significance. 
                                                 
6 Estimating the model by the Newey-West (1987) method with MA=1 produces t = 2.88. 
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Finally, we examine the response of the Euro/dollar exchange rate to the 
probability of Saddam’s fall.  We estimate a model similar to (4) with the dependent 
variable being REURDOLt, the percent change in the Euro/dollar exchange rate on day t: 
REURDOLt = α  + β1 DJUNEt + β2 DJUNEt-1 + ujt ,  (4’) 
A fast victory might strengthen the U.S. economy relative to the Euro-zone economies 
that did not participate in the war (or it might mitigate the damage to the U.S. economy 
relative to the European economies), while a prolonged war may weaken it.  We therefore 
expect that β1 > 0 during the war. Before the war, we have suggested, a rise in the 
probability of Saddam’s fall conveys mixed signals: a greater likelihood of a war 
breaking out, which is costly for the economy, but also an ousting of a threat to the U.S., 
which is good news. Hence, before the war we expect β1 < 0 if the dominating effect is 
the greater likelihood of a costly war, or β1 = 0 if the two effects offset each other. 
 The exchange rates data, obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank, are as of noon 
New York time, which is 7 hours before the close of trading on the Saddam contracts.  
However, these 7 hours are night time in Iraq, when not much news is generated.  Indeed, 
in spite of this mismatch in the timing of the foreign exchange rates and the Saddam 
contract prices, there is no significant lagged effect of the change in the Saddam contract 
prices on exchange rates.  
The estimation results of model (4’) are presented in Table 4. During the war 
period, β1 is positive and significant. That is, a rise in the probability of Saddam’s fall, 
which also indicated a speedy conclusion of the war, strengthened the dollar against the 
Euro.  The war-related events explain nearly 30% of the exchange rate variability, as 
indicated by R2. Using the April contract price, we obtain an even higher explanatory 
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power of the model: R2 = 0.55.  For the pre-war period, β1 < 0 meaning that the rise in the 
probability of Saddam’s fall, which also indicated that a war was likely to break out, 
weakened the U.S. dollar against the Euro. However, this effect is not statistically 
significant from zero. 
 
3. Comparison with Leigh, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2003) 
In a recent independent study, Leigh, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2003) analyze the 
effects of Saddam contracts prices on financial markets, using data on three contracts 
(December 2002, March 2003 and June 2003) up to February 6, 2003, which correspond 
to Period 1 in our analysis.  For this period, Period 1 in our analysis, their results are 
similar to ours:  there is a negative relationship between the probability of Saddam’s fall 
and stock prices.  Leigh et al. (2003), like we do, interpret the probability of Saddam’s 
fall during that period as the probability of war breaking out prior to the contract 
expiration date.  Thus, the higher the Saddam contract price, the greater the expected 
economic costs and the risks due to the war.  We add that a rise in the Saddam contract 
prices also meant a possible benefit from the ousting of Saddam Hussein, which works in 
the opposite direction and therefore weakens the negative effects of the prospects of war.  
Hence the weak negative relationship between Saddam’s contract prices and stock prices 
before the war.   
However, for the war period, which is beyond Leigh et al.’s (2003) sample period, 
we obtain a positive relationship between Saddam contract prices and stock prices.  This 
is because once the war became certain, there was a change in the interpretation of 
Saddam contract prices, as discussed in the introduction.  Higher contract prices meant 
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faster conclusion of the war and lower expected cost and risk, which also works in the 
same direction as the benefit from the ousting of Saddam Hussein.  We also obtain that 
during the war, the effect on oil prices of the probability of Saddam’s fall was negative 
because a speedy end to the war also meant a potential increase in Iraq’s oil supply. 
Before the war, when a rise in the probability of Saddam’s fall was interpreted as a 
greater likelihood of war and potential disruption of oil supply, Leigh et al. (2003) obtain 
that the effect on oil prices was positive.   
   
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper studies the extent to which political events move stock prices by 
examining the effects of changes in the market’s expectations of Saddam Hussein’s fall 
from power.  The expectations are obtained from the prices of traded contracts that 
promised a fixed amount if Saddam were out of power by the contracts’ expiration dates. 
We obtain that during the war, a rise in these expectations had significant positive effects 
on stock prices. The explanatory power of the model is over 40%.  In addition, a rise in 
the probability of Saddam’s fall strengthened the U.S. dollar against the Euro and 
lowered oil prices.  But these results apply only to the war period.  Before the war, a rise 
in the probability of Saddam’s fall lowered stock price (the effect is not always 
statistically significant). It also had a positive effect on oil prices and it weakened the 
U.S. dollar against the Euro (the effects are not statistically significant). 
The differences in the effects of the probability of Saddam’s fall between the two 
periods – the war period and the pre-war period – indicate a change in the interpretation 
of the news reflected in the Saddam contract prices.  Before the war, a rise in the Saddam 
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contract price meant, in addition to a rise in the probability of Saddam being ousted, a 
rise in the probability of a war breaking out, which could be costly to the U.S. economy.  
But conditional on the war breaking out, a rise in the probability of Saddam’s fall by a 
certain (nearby) date meant a speedy end to the war, lower cost on the U.S. economy and 
the realization of the benefits it produces, such as lower oil prices and lower risk of terror 
attacks. 
The very weak explanatory value of news about Saddam’s fall before the war also 
suggests that moves in stock prices reflect something other than fundamental values, as 
suggested by Cutler et al. (1989).  And, it could be that fads and media attention affect 
the weight that the public attributes to news and the extent to which the news is 
incorporated into stock prices.  We detect a gradual adjustment of stock prices to 
information before the war; during the war, with media attention focused on it – that is, 
expectations about Saddam’s fall are big news –the effect on stock prices, oil prices and 
exchange rates is quite strong, and we observe a prompt adjustment of stock prices to 
information.  
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Table 1: Statistics on daily changes in the Saddam contract prices 
 
The Saddam contract promises $1.00 if Saddam is out of power by the contract’s expiration day, which is the last day of the respective 
month. The daily change in the contract price, DPRICE, is denoted DMARCH, DAPRIL and DJUNE according to the contract’s 
expiration day. RM is the daily return on the S&P 500 index. ρk are the coefficients obtained from regressing DPRICEt on its four lags 
and a constant. The t statistics, in parentheses, employ White’s (1980) standard errors. 
 
Contract       Period N Mean SD Min Max ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 
DMARCH 9/24/02-
2/5/03 
91      -0.003 0.034 -0.11 0.12 -0.161
(1.23) 
-0.135 
(1.05) 
-0.035 
(0.22) 
0.065 
(0.93) 
DAPRIL 2/6/03-
4/11/03 
45      0.0084 0.055 -0.12 0.15 0.265
(2.28) 
0.028 
(0.14) 
0.057 
(0.31) 
-0.11 
(0.06) 
DJUNE 9/24/02-
4/11/03 
137      0.0036 0.034 -0.07 0.12 -0.161
(1.53) 
0.013 
(0.15) 
0.054 
(0.58) 
0.065 
(0.82) 
RM 9/24/02-
4/11/03 
137 0.006     0.016 -0.035 -0.047 -0.150
(1.61) 
0.117 
(1.04) 
0.015 
(0.15) 
-0.003 
(0.04) 
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Table 2: The lagged effect of the probability of Saddam’s fall on stock returns 
 
Estimation of the models: 
RMt = α  + β DPRICEt + ut  ,     (1) 
RMt = α  +Σj=02 βj DPRICEt-j + ut .      (2) 
RMt is the daily return on the S&P 500 stock index. DPRICEt is the daily change in the 
price of a contract that promises $1.00 if Saddam is out of power by the contract’s 
expiration day, which is the last day of the respective month. ρ is the residual 
autocorrelation. The t statistics, in parentheses, employ White’s (1980) standard errors. 
 
 
Period Contract Constant DPRICEt DPRICEt-1 DPRICEt-2 R2 ρ 
0.0329 
(0.18) 
-0.041 
(1.09) 
  0.01 -0.160 
(1.40) 
March 
-0.000 
(0.27) 
-0.051 
(1.26) 
-0.065 
(1.25) 
-0.043 
(1.11) 
0.03 -0.174 
(1.57) 
0.0005 
(0.26) 
-0.001 
(0.03) 
  0.00 -0.147 
(1.28) 
9/24/02-
2/5/03, 
91 days 
June 
0.000 
(0.04) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.046 
(0.74) 
-0.025 
(0.54) 
0.00 -0.154 
(1.34) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.035 
(0.45) 
  0.01 -0.134 
(0.74) 
April 
0.000 
(0.02) 
-0.008 
(0.07) 
-0.035 
(0.28) 
0.013 
(0.19) 
0.01 -0.061 
(0.34) 
-0.000 
(0.54) 
-0.056 
(1.02) 
  0.03 -0.120 
(0.68) 
2/6/03-
3/14/03, 
26 days 
 
June 
-0.000 
(0.54) 
-0.058 
(0.91) 
-0.005 
(0.09) 
-0.041 
(0.60) 
0.04 -0.118 
(0.68) 
0.000 
(0.13) 
0.139 
(3.30) 
  0.41 -0.113 
(0.40) 
April 
0.001 
(0.61) 
0.177 
(4.60) 
-0.113 
(2.66) 
0.009 
(0.25) 
0.65 -0.076 
(0.29) 
-0.001 
(0.15) 
0.294 
(3.82) 
  0.43 -0.292 
(1.28) 
3/17/03-
4/11/03, 
20 days 
June 
-0.000 
(0.02) 
0.281 
(3.59) 
-0.066 
(0.88) 
0.035 
(0.55) 
0.46 -0.272 
(1.19) 
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Table 3: The effects of the probability of Saddam’s fall on returns on stock indices 
 
The effects on stock prices 
  
Rjt = αj  + βj DJUNEt + γj RMRESt + ujt  ,     (3) 
Rjt is the daily return on stock index j. DJUNEt is the daily change in the value of the 
futures contract that promises $1.00 if Saddam is out of power by the end of June.  
RMRESt is the residual from a regression of RMt, the daily return on the S&P 500 index 
on DJUNEt (and a constant).   
The t-statistics, in parentheses, employ White’s (1980) standard errors. Period 2, the pre-
war period, is 2/6/2003-3/14/2003 (26 days). Period 3, the war period, is 3/17/2003-
4/11/2003 (20 days).   
The table presents the coefficients βj from this model. 
Group Dependent variable Period 2 
(pre-war) 
Period 3 
(war) 
RIJH 
S&P 400 mid-cap 
-0.049 
(2.01)  
0.193 
(7.05)  
Size indices 
RIJR 
S&P 600 small-cap 
-0.069 
(4.82)  
0.186 
(9.78)  
RXLE 
Energy 
-0.039 
(1.33) 
0.059 
(1.18) 
RXLP 
Consumer staples 
-0.069 
(3.58) 
0.237 
(7.65)  
RXLY 
Consumer  discretionary 
-0.037 
(1.64) 
0.380 
(21.49) 
RXLI 
Industrials 
-0.100 
(3.06)  
0.260 
(8.14) 
RXLB 
Materials 
-0.083 
(3.47)  
0.332 
(6.82) 
RXLK 
Technology 
-0.074 
(2.74) 
0.390 
(11.18) 
RXLF 
Financials 
-0.087 
(5.77) 
0.297 
(5.47) 
RXLV 
Healthcare 
-0.011 
(0.63) 
0.218 
(13.47) 
Sector indices 
RXLU 
Utilities 
-0.056 
(1.63) 
0.156 
(4.30) 
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Table 4: The effects on oil prices and exchange rates 
 
Rjt = αj  + βj0 DJUNEt +βj1 DJUNEt-1 + ujt  ,    (4) 
Rjt is either ROILt, the daily return on the spot price of oil, West Texas Intermediate, or 
REURDOLt, the daily return on the Euro/Dollar spot exchange rate. DJUNEt is the daily 
change in the price of a contract that promises $1.00 if Saddam is out of power by the last 
day of June, the contract’s expiration day. ρ is the residual autocorrelation. The t-
statistics, in parentheses, employ White’s (1980) standard errors. The pre-war period is 
2/6/2003-3/14/2003 (26 days). The war period is 3/17/2003-4/11/2003 (20 days).   
 
 
 
Period Period Constant DJUNEt DJUNEt-1 R2 ρ 
0.001 
(0.32) 
0.095 
(1.25) 
 0.03 0.41 
(1.73) 
Pre-war 
0.002 
(0.35) 
0.090 
(1.06) 
-0.037 
(0.25) 
0.03 0.41 
(1.74) 
-0.005 
(0.29) 
-0.410 
(1.03) 
 0.04 0.33 
(0.92) 
Oil, 
West 
Texas 
Intermediate 
War 
-0.001 
(0.06) 
-0.499 
(1.55) 
-0.482 
(1.48) 
0.10 0.34 
(0.87) 
-0.001 
(0.54) 
-0.044 
(1.30) 
 0.10 0.29 
(1.13) 
Pre-war 
-0.000 
(0.41) 
-0.041 
(1.15) 
0.022 
(1.16) 
0.12 0.30 
(1.09) 
-0.001 
(0.78) 
0.102 
(3.78) 
 0.28 -0.20 
(0.95) 
Exchange 
rate, 
Euro/dollar 
War 
-0.001 
(0.87) 
0.105 
(3.33) 
0.017 
(0.46) 
0.29 -0.21 
(1.08) 
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Figure 1 
Daily closing prices of the March 2003, April 2003 and June 2003 contracts on Saddam’s 
fall, as traded on Sportstrades.com. The prices are as of 24:00 of the day, Ireland time. 
The contract promises to pay 100 if by the last day of the contract’s month Saddam is 
“not recognized internationally as the leader of Iraq.”  Panel A includes the March and 
June contracts, and Panel B includes the April and June contracts. 
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B: 2/6/2003-4/11/2003 
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